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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
New Indonesian president Joko Widodo’s inexperience in foreign affairs 
and his focus on domestic issues will see him delegate decisions on 
foreign and security policy to his key advisers. This will result in 
increased competition between the institutions those advisers lead. On 
issues where a consensus does not emerge, this competition will make it 
more difficult for Indonesian foreign policy-makers to define a clear 
position. 
Jokowi’s closest advisers on foreign and security policy are sophisticated 
and internationalist, with significant experience abroad. But others, 
including members of his own party and the foreign ministry, take more 
nationalist stances on specific issues. Indonesian foreign policy is likely 
to remain independent but Western-leaning, in accordance with a broad 
consensus in Jakarta. But more nationalist voices could achieve greater 
influence over Indonesian foreign policy at the margins, and on isolated 
issues that capture the imagination of the political and diplomatic elite. 
Against this backdrop, Australia may find it more difficult to manage 
crises in the bilateral relationship. 
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On 20 October, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) will retire 
to his residence at Cikeas in the hills south of Jakarta. His successor, 
Jakarta Governor Joko Widodo, comes into office without the benefit of 
SBY’s decades of experience in military and foreign affairs. Yet just three 
weeks after taking office, Jokowi, as the president-elect is known, is 
expected to attend his first series of international summits, in Beijing, 
Naypyitaw, and Brisbane.1 What can we expect in world affairs from a 
man who was, just over two years ago, the mayor of the small city of 
Surakarta? 
This paper first outlines the role that SBY played in Indonesian foreign 
policy in order to illustrate the void that he leaves behind. It then reviews 
Jokowi’s statements on foreign affairs and argues that his lack of 
experience on the world stage — and more importantly, his lack of 
experience in the institutions that implement Indonesian foreign policy — 
will lead to greater competition over foreign policy in Jakarta. On issues 
where a consensus does not emerge, this competition will make it more 
difficult for Indonesian foreign policy-makers to define a clear position. 
This paper also identifies the key people providing advice to Jokowi on 
foreign policy, and how they might influence his views. Finally, it explores 
how this context might affect Indonesia’s view of its place in the Indo-
Pacific region, its approach to the South China Sea dispute, and its 
relationship with Australia. 
SBY’S DEPARTURE LEAVES A VOID 
When SBY vacates the State Palace on 20 October, he will leave a void 
in Indonesia’s foreign policy-making system. SBY was Indonesia’s 
indisputable leader on foreign policy, relying on his interest and 
experience in the subject, institutional reforms, and his military seniority 
to assert full control of a previously unwieldy foreign policy apparatus.  
Throughout his long army career, SBY showed keen interest in foreign 
policy. Early in his presidency, he strove to position himself as an 
international statesman and foreign policy intellectual. In his first term, he 
redefined Indonesia’s view of its place in the international system as a 
country with “a thousand friends and zero enemies” and an “all directions 
foreign policy.” 2 He sought to improve ties with both the United States 
and China, but also made a show of diplomacy with Iran and North 
Korea.3 He pursued warmer relations with neighbouring countries, 
including Australia, Singapore, and Malaysia, resisting demands from 
the bureaucracy and legislature that he take a harder line in various 
disputes. 
SBY also led institutional reforms that consolidated foreign policy-making 
in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the State Palace, thereby 
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eliminating institutional competition over foreign policy between the 
military and the foreign ministry.4 During the New Order period, as 
Suharto’s rule is known, foreign policy had been the province of the 
president and several key advisers, most of whom were current or 
former officers in the Indonesian armed forces (TNI). The military had 
also effectively controlled the foreign ministry, filling many key positions 
in the ministry and ambassadorships overseas with generals.5 Though 
the military began to withdraw from politics in 1998, generals remained in 
high-ranking diplomatic posts for several more years, retaining influence 
over important decisions and leading to policy disagreements between 
leading generals and diplomats.6 
SBY continued a process begun under Hassan Wirajuda, whom he 
retained as foreign minister when he succeeded President Megawati 
Sukarnoputri, to shift responsibility for foreign policy from the military to 
the foreign ministry, and to professionalise the diplomatic corps. In doing 
so, the former general turned president made clear that, in a democratic 
Indonesia, the military would be subordinate to the foreign ministry on 
matters of diplomacy. 
To drive his foreign policy agenda, SBY transformed the sleepy foreign 
affairs unit in the State Palace, which housed only an interpreter and 
translator under his predecessor, into an engine of diplomatic 
engagement.7 The unit, then known as the Presidential Staff for Foreign 
Affairs, or SPHI, was led during SBY’s first term by his confidante Dino 
Patti Djalal.8 
Dino was a professional diplomat who held the humble title of 
‘presidential spokesman for foreign affairs’, but acted as the president’s 
closest foreign policy adviser.9 His staff of hand-picked young diplomats, 
backed by the president’s imprimatur, exercised extraordinary 
influence.10 Yet SPHI also functioned as an outpost of the foreign 
ministry in the Palace, further elevating the ministry above other voices, 
particularly the military, in the conduct of foreign affairs. 
Though SBY pushed for greater civilian control of foreign policy in office, 
his own military seniority allowed him a greater degree of deference as 
he presided over these changes. As a graduate of the 1973 class of the 
Indonesian Armed Forces Academy, SBY was senior to generals who 
graduated from later classes, many of whom he appointed to the armed 
forces staff or as cabinet ministers during his presidency. His seniority 
offered him a degree of deference above and beyond that due his 
office.11  
We should not overstate SBY’s foreign policy record. Though Indonesia 
under SBY was widely perceived to have become a rising power and an 
important emerging market, many of these accolades came Indonesia’s 
way due to its size and strong economic performance. Indeed, SBY’s 
foreign policy vision was often short on details, and like many of his 
domestic policies, avoided hard choices. (A vision of “a thousand friends 
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and zero enemies” and an “all directions foreign policy” avoids hard 
choices by definition.) These policies were part of an approach to 
diplomacy that prioritised the promotion of Indonesia’s profile overseas 
ahead of progress on thorny issues in world affairs.  
Yet within Jakarta, SBY reduced the scope for institutional 
disagreements by placing the foreign ministry in the lead. When 
institutional positions conflicted with SBY’s vision of Indonesia’s role in 
the world, SBY could be seen to overrule ministers and generals with 
whom he disagreed, a prerogative that he exercised far less frequently in 
domestic affairs. For example, SBY overruled his foreign minister, Marty 
Natalegawa, in sending Ambassador Nadjib Riphat Kesoema back to 
Canberra in May 2014, having withdrawn him six months earlier in the 
wake of the release of documents that alleged that Australia had 
eavesdropped on Indonesian officials.12 With regards to the military, 
early in SBY’s presidency he withdrew the appointment, made by his 
predecessor, of General Ryamizard Ryacudu to be head of the armed 
forces. SBY and Ryamizard had repeatedly clashed over the approach 
to the issue of Aceh, with Ryamizard favoring a harder line and SBY 
preferring a negotiated solution.13  
For ten years, SBY comfortably presided over the making of Indonesian 
foreign policy. His departure now leaves a large hole that Jokowi will 
struggle to fill. 
FACE OF THE VILLAGE, INTERNATIONAL BRAIN 
Jokowi represents a new model of political advancement in Indonesia. 
Unlike his six predecessors, Jokowi did not rise to the presidency 
through the military or the political party systems. Jokowi’s rise began in 
2005, when the successful entrepreneur was recruited by fellow 
business leaders to run for mayor of his hometown of Surakarta.14 
“For 24 years, I exported furniture”, Jokowi told business leaders in 
Jakarta earlier this year. “I may have the face of someone who comes 
from the village, but I have an international brain.”15 The business that 
Jokowi founded in 1988 prospered over time, and his travels often took 
him to Europe, the United States, and Australia. He learned halting 
English. He sent his sons to school in Singapore and Australia, where 
his oldest received a business diploma after two years at the University 
of Technology in Sydney. But while Jokowi’s success offered him a 
glimpse of the world beyond Indonesia, he was never a member of the 
cosmopolitan but cozy Jakarta business elite, with its strong political 
connections. Rather, it was his turn leading his hometown, population 
500,000, which set him on a path to the presidential palace. 
As mayor of Surakarta, Jokowi slowly built consensus for his policies, 
winning over sceptical constituents and bureaucrats in order to build a 
public transportation system and clear out slums. In 2012, supported by 
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tycoons and political leaders eager to harness the enthusiasm that 
Jokowi’s success in Surakarta had engendered, he successfully 
challenged an old guard incumbent to become governor of the sprawling 
capital, Jakarta, a city of 10 million. He immediately set about improving 
city government, rolling out a city-wide healthcare scheme and finally 
starting work on a long-awaited urban rail system.  
As soon as he was elected governor of Jakarta the press began to 
speak of him as a potential presidential contender. He began his 
presidential election campaign in 2014 with strong backing in the polls. 
But that lead was whittled away by his opponent, retired Lt. General 
Prabowo Subianto. Prabowo’s well-funded and well-organised campaign 
outpaced and outsmarted Jokowi at several turns. Nevertheless, Jokowi 
eventually prevailed. Exit polls later showed that Jokowi outperformed 
Prabowo in rural areas, where Prabowo’s populist message did not have 
its hoped-for effect. Jokowi’s humble origins and demeanor — the face 
from the village, rather than an international brain, in his words — put 
him over the top. 
JOKOWI WILL LEAVE FOREIGN POLICY TO HIS 
ADVISERS 
Jokowi is new to the practice of diplomacy. He does not appear to come 
to the presidency with any strong views about Indonesia’s place in the 
world, or any particular passion for the subject. Jokowi sees himself 
primarily as a domestic reformer, not an international statesman. And 
indeed, the domestic reforms that he has advocated in the areas of 
infrastructure and the fight against corruption, if executed, would enable 
economic growth that would allow Indonesia to play a much greater role 
in world affairs.16 Yet his focus on domestic issues, combined with strong 
opposition from an opposition coalition in the Indonesian legislature, 
have left him little time for foreign policy. Instead, he has relied upon 
some of Indonesia’s strongest minds in foreign affairs to provide him with 
a ready-made vision of Indonesia’s place in the region and international 
relations.  
In May, Jokowi’s foreign policy team provided an early look at how they 
would approach foreign policy. His campaign released a detailed visi-
misi or ‘vision and mission’ statement in fulfilment of the requirements to 
register a presidential candidacy.17 Like leaders leaving behind election 
manifestos the world over, Jokowi is unlikely to feel bound by the 
document once in office, but it is a good place to start in attempting to 
understand his advisers’ concerns. Although the visi-misi statement 
lacks anything in the way of grand strategy or a vision of Indonesia’s role 
amidst great power rivalry, it does include a list of foreign policy priorities.  
The statement lists Jokowi’s four foreign policy priorities as 1) promoting 
Indonesia’s identity as an archipelagic state, 2) enhancing the global role 
of middle power diplomacy, 3) expanding engagement in the Indo-
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Pacific region, and 4) further reform of the foreign ministry to emphasise 
economic diplomacy — support Jokowi would have no doubt liked to 
have received when he was a furniture exporter. Elsewhere in the 
document, Jokowi committed his administration to increasing the 
defence budget to 1.5 per cent of GDP from its current 0.8 per cent — 
though he later conditioned that increase on 7 per cent GDP growth, 
which seems unlikely as Indonesia’s economy continues to cool from its 
recent height of 6.5 per cent. 
Throughout his campaign Jokowi also placed a particular emphasis on 
maritime issues.18 He reinforced that emphasis in his most prominent 
remarks on foreign policy during the campaign, at the 22 June foreign 
policy debate, arguing that Indonesia should function as a “global 
maritime axis”, a proposal derivative of his focus on increasing maritime 
commerce within the archipelago. It is a slogan that his advisers are now 
working to fill out with substantive policy recommendations. Among 
those recommendations are likely to be the elevation of the Indian 
Ocean Rim Association (IORA) annual meeting to a leaders’ summit, 
which Indonesia is set to chair in 2015. Indonesian diplomats believe 
that IORA could be an “APEC for the Indian Ocean”, but there are 
obstacles to turning it into a useful organisation, particularly its 
checkered membership around the region, and the lack of a pressing 
mission.19 
Jokowi has repeated the broad vision laid out in his visi-misi statement in 
debates and interviews, but he occasionally stumbles through 
explanations of it, and there is no evidence of any deeply held 
commitment to it. He is unlikely to expend any significant energy in 
international diplomacy or in arbitrating internal debates over Indonesian 
foreign policy, particularly in a challenging domestic political environment 
that will demand all of his attention.  
As a result, for the first time in ten years, the Indonesian state will lack a 
paramount policy-maker on foreign affairs at its apex. In the space 
vacated by SBY but not assumed by Jokowi, disagreements over foreign 
policy within the Cabinet are likely to be litigated more vigorously and 
openly than in the past, leading to decreased clarity on policies where no 
consensus emerges. It is important, then, to understand the people 
advising Jokowi. 
A PREVIEW OF JOKOWI’S TEAM 
As Jokowi learns more about foreign affairs through the practice of it, he 
may come to his own views on the subject. But until he does, he will rely 
upon a team of advisers for foreign policy advice. They include long-time 
political supporters with expertise in the area, academics recruited to 
tutor Jokowi as he prepared his candidacy, the leadership of Jokowi’s 
political party, an experienced vice president, military leaders, and 
professional diplomats. 
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LUHUT PANJAITAN, JOKOWI’S OLDEST SUPPORTER 
Jokowi’s closest adviser on national security matters is General (Ret.) 
Luhut Panjaitan. Luhut was a special forces (Kopassus) commander 
during the New Order, who developed a particular expertise in counter-
terrorism, becoming the first leader of the elite counter-terrorism unit 
Detachment 81 in the 1980s. 
After the fall of Suharto, Luhut briefly served as ambassador to 
Singapore and minister of trade and industry under President 
Abdurrahman Wahid. He arrived in Singapore when tensions between 
Indonesia and Singapore were at a high. Nevertheless, Singaporean 
diplomats have praised Luhut’s approach to diplomacy with Indonesia’s 
neighbours as reasonable and cooperative. 
Although Luhut was asked to stay on after Megawati became president, 
he decided to leave government to found a resources business instead. 
As that business became highly successful, he became involved in 
Golkar Party politics, rising to become deputy chairman of its board from 
2008-2014. (Golkar was once the party of Suharto, but now exists as 
one of three large nationalist — as opposed to Islamic-based — parties.) 
He resigned in May 2014 after Golkar backed the candidacy of Prabowo, 
with whom he had a long rivalry in the military.  
Luhut’s relationship with Jokowi goes back further than any of Jokowi’s 
other advisers on foreign affairs and national security. In 2008, Luhut 
was looking for someone who could turn raw timber from his forestry 
concession in Kalimantan into finished products. An acquaintance 
introduced him to a furniture exporter who had recently been elected 
mayor of Surakarta. Luhut could not have known at the time that Jokowi 
would become the President of the Republic just six years later, but he 
has supported him throughout. His financial largesse kept Jokowi’s 
presidential campaign afloat. When Jokowi declared victory in front of 
the Proklamasi Statue on 9 July, Luhut stood beside him. 
Luhut will remain influential with Jokowi whether or not he takes a 
Cabinet post. He would be a likely candidate to become Coordinating 
Minister for Politics, Law, and the Economy, a post that has traditionally 
been occupied by retired generals. There is talk in Jakarta of giving 
coordinating ministers greater authority over line ministries — in this 
case, the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs — which would make 
them significantly more powerful. The post’s counter-terrorism focus 
under SBY would suit Luhut’s background, although it is not clear that its 
next occupant would retain those roles. 
Wherever Luhut lands, he is likely to be a key interlocutor for officials 
from neighbouring countries, particularly Australia, Singapore and 
Malaysia, as all four begin to confront the threat of Southeast Asian and 
Australian jihadists returning from the Middle East. 
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RIZAL SUKMA HAS THE EAR OF THE PRESIDENT 
Jokowi’s surprisingly strong performance in the campaign’s only foreign 
policy debate can largely be attributed to the advice provided by Rizal 
Sukma, the executive director of the Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta. Sukma tutored Jokowi for 
months on foreign policy issues as a member of the group of academics 
known as ‘Team 11’ that began preparing Jokowi for a run at the 
presidency months before his candidacy was announced, and 
conducted preparation sessions in the days leading up to the debate. He 
also played a leading role in crafting the foreign policy sections of 
Jokowi’s visi-misi statement. 
Sukma is well known to foreign diplomats and think tankers in world 
capitals, who often praise his unsentimental approach to international 
relations and his forthright speaking style. As the executive director of 
CSIS, Sukma was able to tap the expertise within his organisation in 
preparing Jokowi for the presidency. He is likely to continue to do so as 
he advises Jokowi in government. 
Alhough Sukma is often talked about as a potential foreign minister, 
those close to him say that he is ambivalent about taking up a role at the 
head of an unwieldy bureaucracy. Indonesian diplomats have also 
expressed apprehension at the prospect of being led by someone who 
did not rise up through their ranks, suggesting Sukma would struggle to 
gain acceptance from the ministry’s senior leadership.20 A more likely 
role for Sukma would be as a senior adviser, perhaps in the State 
Palace, leading a small staff advising Jokowi on foreign affairs. 
SENIOR DIPLOMATS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY VIE FOR PRE-
EMINENCE 
The next foreign minister is more likely to come from the professional 
diplomatic corps, particularly a group of Hassan Wirajuda protégés 
known as ‘Hassan’s Boys’. This group, which includes incumbent foreign 
minister Marty Natalegawa, was promoted quickly by Wirajuda during his 
eight-year tenure as foreign minister.21 
Within the group, Indonesian diplomats often distinguish between those 
with legal training, like Wirajuda himself, and those with international 
relations training, like Natalegawa. It is possible that Natalegawa could 
remain in office for a period of weeks following Jokowi’s inauguration to 
ensure Indonesia’s successful participation in the series of international 
summits that begin three weeks after Jokowi takes office. But over the 
past few months, a number of diplomats who served under Natalegawa 
have objected to his leadership style, and he is said to lack a strong 
supporter within Jokowi’s inner circle.22 
If the next foreign minister is a lawyer, it may very well be Indonesia’s 
ambassador to the European Union, Arif Havas Oegroseno. Though 
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Havas was dispatched to Brussels shortly after Natalegawa was named 
foreign minister, he previously served as Wirajuda’s point man on 
international maritime negotiations, an area of critical importance to an 
archipelagic state with long-standing preoccupations regarding 
depredations on its sovereignty. As a change in Cabinet has neared, 
Havas has sought to raise his profile in Jakarta through a series of op-
eds and public appearances. 
Havas and the legalists in the foreign ministry approach diplomatic 
problems as legal problems, which can frustrate Western diplomats who 
espouse a realist approach to international relations, or who are 
interested in a more transactional relationship. But as foreign minister, 
he would be a strong voice for international law in a region where much 
of the debate about the rise of China turns on its disrespect for 
international law in the South China Sea. 
PDI-P STALWARTS RELY ON MEGAWATI’S INFLUENCE 
Jokowi is a member of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, led 
by Megawati Sukarnoputri. While Megawati and other leaders of the 
party are generally adherents of the status quo in the regional order, they 
often look to her father and Indonesia’s founding president, Sukarno, for 
rhetorical inspiration. Sukarno was president at a very different time, 
when Indonesia’s struggle for independence and tensions with its 
neighbours defined its foreign policy. As a result, the view of Indonesia’s 
place in the world espoused by Megawati and PDI-P members can often 
seem more adversarial toward the West than it really is. 
There is widespread debate within Jakarta regarding the level of 
influence that Megawati and other PDI-P stalwarts will wield in Jokowi’s 
administration. During the election campaign, she and her daughter 
Puan Maharani, who leads PDI-P’s caucus in the legislature, sought to 
minimise Jokowi’s role in decision-making. Megawati told a press 
conference on the eve of the campaign that Jokowi was merely an 
official of the party tasked with carrying out its ideology, a statement that 
contributed to widespread concerns among the electorate that Jokowi 
was a ‘puppet candidate’.23  
While Megawati is unlikely to advocate for specific policies, she does 
want to be seen as the party’s matriarch and a senior statesman. She 
may also seek to place loyalists in key positions as a means of 
entrenching her patronage networks in the Jokowi administration. She 
appears to have enjoyed early success in this effort, manoeuvring her 
former trade minister, Rini Soemarno, to the head of Jokowi’s transition 
team. While people close to Jokowi have repeatedly suggested that he 
would begin to push back against Megawati’s personnel choices as he 
came closer to assuming power, there has been little evidence of that so 
far.24 
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Several former military officers close to Megawati have held advisory 
roles on the campaign and transition teams, among them Ryamizard 
Ryacudu, who served as commander of the Army under Megawati, and 
A.M. Hendropriyono, who served as her intelligence chief. Human rights 
activists have raised concerns about both, citing their hard line against 
separatism and dissent when they were in office.25 They do not, 
however, appear to have had any appreciable effect on Jokowi’s thinking 
or public statements. 
Much more consequential has been the contribution of Andi Widjajanto, 
formerly a defence scholar at the University of Indonesia who resigned 
his position to lead Jokowi’s campaign team. He currently serves as one 
of the deputies on the transition team for defence and security matters. 
Andi’s father was a loyal aide to Megawati. His dying wish was that his 
son should help PDI-P recapture the presidency. Nevertheless, Andi’s 
credentials extend beyond lineage, as one of Indonesia’s most 
prominent advocates of the transformation of TNI. 
JUSUF KALLA, AN EXPERIENCED VICE PRESIDENT 
Jusuf Kalla returns to the vice presidency, which he held from 2004-
2009, after five years. Jokowi would be wise to use Kalla, a veteran deal-
maker who served as the chairman of Golkar while vice president, to 
negotiate difficult deals with an obstructionist legislature. But people 
close to the two men say that Jokowi has reined in Kalla, fearful that his 
deals — which by their very nature protect or advance rival politicians’ 
political or economic interests — are unethical, and will thus dilute 
Jokowi’s moral authority.  
If Jokowi refuses to allow Kalla to make deals in the legislature, Kalla 
may turn to another area of interest, foreign affairs. As vice president, 
Kalla played a major role in the conclusion of the peace agreement in 
Aceh. Since then, he has offered his good offices as a peacemaker to 
opposing sides in conflicts in Southern Thailand, the Philippine island of 
Mindanao, and Mayanmar’s Rakhine State, as well — all areas with 
large Muslim populations that suffer from sectarian violence. 
THE APRIL 2014 SOUTH CHINA SEA DEBATE 
A policy dispute that erupted in April between the foreign ministry and 
the military over Indonesian policy on the South China Sea provides a 
preview of disagreements that are likely to emerge under Jokowi. It is 
worthwhile, therefore, to take a closer look at the dynamics of that 
dispute to understand what might be in store under Jokowi. 
As Chinese behaviour in the South China Sea has become increasingly 
assertive, Indonesia has sought to facilitate dialogue between the 
claimant states, China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei and 
Malaysia.26 Jakarta’s role in the South China Sea is often cited as an 
example of Indonesian leadership in regional affairs. Yet Indonesia must 
 INDONESIAN FOREIGN POLICY UNDER PRESIDENT JOKOWI 
 
11
 
manage its own tensions with China regarding its behaviour in the South 
China Sea in the waters off the Natuna Islands, which are part of 
Indonesia’s Riau Islands province, and form the southern limit of the 
South China Sea. 
Though China does not claim Natuna (unlike islands off the Vietnamese, 
Philippine, Brunei, and Malaysian coasts) Beijing has articulated a claim 
to the waters off the coast of Natuna, which Indonesia claims as its 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Indonesian attempts to enforce its 
fisheries law in these waters have been met with Chinese opposition. 
Several times over the past four years, Chinese Fisheries Law 
Enforcement Command (FLEC) vessels are reported to have threatened 
the use of force against Indonesian law enforcement vessels to compel 
the release of Chinese fishermen in its claimed EEZ.27 
In general, the foreign ministry’s practice has been to downplay tensions 
rather than allow them to complicate its efforts to facilitate dialogue 
among the claimant states. Indonesia has noted the questionable legality 
of China’s claim to what Beijing terms ‘territorial waters’ and, in 2010, 
requested clarification from Beijing regarding these claims.28 No 
response has been forthcoming. 
In the first few months of 2014, the TNI announced plans to deploy 
fighter jets and attack helicopters to Natuna.29 Air Commodore Fahru 
Zaini, on the staff of the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and 
Security Affairs, made clear that the deployments were in response to 
Chinese claims.30 Yet when Natalegawa was asked about the moves, he 
repeated long-standing Indonesian policy, denying that Indonesia and 
China had any territorial disputes, and even citing Indonesian efforts to 
attract Chinese investment to Natuna.31  
In normal times under SBY, Natalegawa’s comments would have settled 
the debate. But with the end of SBY’s tenure just six months away, and a 
number of senior officials in his administration angling for a place in post-
SBY Jakarta, SBY’s grip on the foreign policy apparatus began to 
loosen. On 24 April, the commander of TNI, General Moeldoko — 
rumoured at the time to be under consideration as Jokowi’s vice-
presidential nominee — wrote an op-ed for The Wall Street Journal 
outlining a more hawkish position on the South China Sea.32 
Moeldoko wrote that Indonesia was “dismayed… that China has 
included parts of the Natuna Islands within the nine-dash line.”33 Despite 
the preceding controversy, Moeldoko did not consult the president or the 
foreign minister prior to publication.34 Senior Indonesian diplomats 
expressed dismay at the op-ed’s appearance and its erroneous analysis, 
although the president declined to step in to clarify the Indonesian 
position.35 When asked to explain Indonesian policy on the dispute, 
diplomats and defence officials in Jakarta give varying weight to the TNI 
and foreign ministry positions.36 
Yet Indonesia must 
manage its own tensions 
with China regarding its 
behaviour in the South 
China Sea in the waters 
off the Natuna Islands. 
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Moeldoko’s tenure as head of the Armed Forces is scheduled to come to 
an end next year when he reaches the mandatory retirement age of 58 
in July 2015, although it could be extended. While his replacement may 
be less outspoken about Indonesian rights in the South China Sea, the 
underlying difference in emphasis regarding the nature of Indonesia’s 
South China Sea problem will remain. 
Jokowi’s visi-misi statement commits him to ensuring the integrity of 
Indonesia’s maritime sovereignty and to securing marine resources in its 
EEZ, while also committing him to dampening maritime rivalry among 
the great powers and to peaceful settlement of disputes. This position 
struggles to integrate both the TNI and the foreign ministry’s approach to 
the issue, signaling less tolerance for Chinese encroachment in the 
Indonesian EEZ, while seeking to remain an honest broker in the 
broader dispute. 
When the question has been put directly to Jokowi, his answers have 
varied. When asked about the issue in a presidential debate, Jokowi said 
that Indonesia had no claims in the area, and that it should only 
intervene if it could propose a solution to the problem. In later interviews, 
he has hewed closer to the foreign ministry line, saying that he would like 
to see Indonesia serve as an ‘honest broker’ in the South China Sea. 
Both the nuanced visi-misi statement and varying interview answers 
since then are likely to raise further uncertainty regarding Indonesian 
policy. 
Meanwhile, Prabowo has pushed the military line regarding the dispute. 
Prabowo’s coalition has already begun to pressure Jokowi on domestic 
issues in the legislature, where a coalition of parties that supported his 
candidacy have a significant number of seats. He can be expected to do 
the same on foreign and security policy, where he is perceived to have 
an advantage because of his military background. 
Disagreements between military brass and foreign ministries are 
commonplace around the world, but rarely are they aired so openly on 
such a critical issue. Without a strong hand at the top of the Indonesian 
foreign policy-making system to settle such disputes, we are likely to see 
many more of them under President-elect Jokowi. Amidst this greater 
turbidity, Indonesian leadership in regional affairs will take a hit. 
TENSION IN INDONESIAN FOREIGN POLICY 
Much of the debate in Indonesian foreign policy turns on the participants’ 
interpretation of a dictum from Mohammed Hatta, Indonesia’s first vice 
president, that Indonesia’s foreign policy should be “independent and 
active”. The dictum — so malleable that it was able to serve both the 
revisionist and stridently anti-imperialist first president, Sukarno, and his 
successor, the fiercely anti-communist Suharto — is still generally 
accepted as the foundation of Indonesian foreign policy. 
Amidst this greater 
turbidity, Indonesian 
leadership in regional 
affairs will take a hit. 
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Yet there is a tension between its two parts for a middle power such as 
Indonesia; a more active role in global affairs often requires close 
alignment with a great power. Typically nationalist leaders have chosen 
independence, or non-alignment, at the cost of more effective diplomacy, 
while pragmatic leaders have chosen to play a more active role in 
foreign affairs while aligning more closely with the West. This tension 
can be seen among Jokowi’s advisers, as well. 
Jokowi’s closest advisers, particularly Luhut and Sukma, are pragmatic 
in their approach and have little time for nationalist demagoguery on 
diplomatic and security issues. Sukma’s writings and Luhut’s actions in 
Singapore bear this out. They will seek to continue SBY’s broadly 
conciliatory and cooperative approach to Indonesia’s relationships with 
its neighbours and the great powers. Others, however, including some 
senior diplomats in the foreign ministry and leaders in PDI-P, are more 
enamoured with nationalist rhetoric intended to put neighbouring 
countries in their place, and a foreign policy that emphasises 
independence from Western influence.  
While Luhut and Sukma’s proximity to the president suggests that they 
are likely to prevail in policy debates, they may not win in internal policy 
debates as swiftly or as decisively as they would have under SBY, 
whose overriding desire to avoid tensions with other foreign leaders 
often pushed him towards pragmatism. Jokowi’s lack of interest in 
foreign affairs, again, will magnify any disagreements. 
Moreover, nationalists in the Indonesian legislature, particularly among 
the coalition of parties that supported Prabowo in the presidential 
election, may also push Jokowi toward less conciliatory policies. Several 
similar efforts by members of Commission I, the legislative body 
overseeing foreign affairs, successfully pushed SBY towards a more 
non-aligned stance over issues such as sanctions on Iran.37 Prabowo’s 
coalition will likely push more such efforts, if for no other reason than to 
gain political advantage by impugning Jokowi’s nationalist credentials. 
Yet while nationalists in PDI-P, the foreign ministry, and the legislature 
may push Indonesian policy in more nationalist directions at the margins, 
they do not seek to overhaul Indonesian foreign policy more broadly. In 
its general orientation, Indonesia can thus be expected to maintain the 
slight lean to the West established under SBY, while taking a more 
nationalist stance on specific issues that capture the imagination of the 
political and diplomatic elite. Issues that have done so in the past have 
included trade and microeconomic policy, which are likely to continue in 
a protectionist direction, and incidents in which Indonesian sovereignty is 
perceived to have been violated.   
 
Nationalists in the 
Indonesian legislature, 
particularly among the 
coalition of parties that 
supported Prabowo in 
the presidential election, 
may also push Jokowi 
toward less conciliatory 
policies. 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR AUSTRALIA 
The departure of SBY from the State Palace marks the end of a 
significant era in Australia’s relationship with Indonesia. SBY never gave 
Australia a free pass — he is the only Indonesian president to have 
recalled his ambassador to Canberra; and he did it not once, but twice. 
He did, however, have an active interest in the relationship and sought 
positive working ties with his Australian counterparts; through the 
Lombok Treaty, concluded in 2006, he put the bilateral relationship on a 
firmer footing. 
Jokowi is no stranger to Australia, having traveled to Indonesia’s 
southern neighbour for business, holidays, and to visit his son when he 
was in school in Sydney. Nor is he ill-disposed to the country. During the 
foreign policy debate on 22 June, he told Indonesians that Australia had 
not always respected Indonesian dignity because of a lack of trust 
between the two. Nevertheless, he argued it was important to build up 
economic and people-to-people ties to create greater trust. Similarly, 
Australian officials have long argued that enhancing economic and 
people-to-people ties would create ballast in the relationship that would 
help it weather crises.38 
Yet precisely because the bilateral relationship lacks ballast, when crises 
emerge it takes a greater effort at the political level to bridge the 
differences between the two. It is this greater effort that SBY regularly 
led. Jokowi, focused on domestic reforms and beset by strident political 
opposition at home — political opposition that is looking for opportunities 
to criticise Jokowi as insufficiently nationalist — is less likely to make that 
effort.  
As a result, the bilateral relationship may prove more difficult to manage 
under Jokowi than it was under SBY. This is particularly the case with 
issues that impinge on Indonesia's sovereignty or dignity and capture the 
imagination of Indonesian nationalists in the legislature and foreign 
ministry, such as the espionage scandal that damaged ties between 
Australia and Indonesia in 2013. Any repeat of the latter, for example, 
could be more difficult to resolve under Jokowi than it was under SBY. 
Jokowi’s focus on domestic reforms is not all bad news for Australia, 
however. Success in his fights against corruption and to improve 
Indonesia’s dilapidated infrastructure would not only grow Indonesia’s 
economy and improve Indonesians’ living standards, it would also create 
greater opportunities for trade with and investment in Indonesia. If 
Jokowi can overcome opposition to his domestic reforms, his investment 
in these areas will pay significant long-term dividends in the bilateral 
relationship. 
 
…the bilateral relationship 
may prove more difficult 
to manage under Jokowi 
than it was under SBY. 
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CONCLUSION 
Jokowi’s reformist credentials and meteoric rise from a bamboo shack to 
the State Palace are reasons for hope and celebration for Indonesians 
and foreigners alike. If he can overcome substantial domestic opposition 
to his agenda, he may yet make a great contribution to Indonesia’s 
development and democratic progress. 
Yet his focus on domestic reforms and his inexperience in foreign affairs 
suggest that his presidency will lead to less clearly defined positions on 
specific foreign policy issues, less Indonesian leadership in foreign 
affairs, and perhaps a more nationalist reaction in some international 
disputes. 
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president or foreign minister. His foreign policy advisers, however, are 
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predecessor, Megawati Sukarnoputri, to address the threat of terrorism in 
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approached China with a coolness born of Mao-era fears (which were slow to 
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throughout. 
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9 Interview with Indonesian diplomat, September 2014. 
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been appointed to director-general rank in the hierarchical foreign ministry, he 
addressed the foreign minister as an equal in formal settings. Dino would 
address foreign minister Hassan Wirajuda as “Yang terhormat saudara Menlu”, 
rather than “Yang terhormat Bapak Menlu”, as a diplomat of his rank would 
normally do. (Interview with Indonesian diplomat, September 2014). 
11 Interview with a foreign diplomat, Jakarta, September 2014. 
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14 For a more in-depth look at Jokowi’s earlier years, see Michael Bachelard, 
“Joko Widodo: Man with a Mission,” Sydney Morning Herald, 14 June 2014, 
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http://www.smh.com.au/lifestyle/joko-widodo-man-with-a-mission-20140609-
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islands, Jokowi has proposed billions in infrastructure spending to make 
commerce and transportation between the two cheaper and easier. 
19 Interview with Indonesian diplomats and advisers to Jokowi, Jakarta, 
September 2014.The organisation’s Delhi-centric character limits its 
membership. Pakistan, Myanmar, Somalia, Djibouti, and the Maldives remain 
outside the organisation.  
20 Indonesian diplomats have frequently expressed their displeasure by warning 
that “it would be a mistake to repeat the Alwi Shihab experiment”. Alwi was the 
first foreign minister from a political party background since the Old Order, 
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language newspapers. Many Indonesian diplomats have argued that Marty 
should not be retained in office because he has become too distant and 
insensitive to the concerns of the rank and file. 
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OnLine, 14 May 2014, http://www.republika.co.id/berita/en/national-
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